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Quantum key distribution (QKD) permits information-theoretically secure transmission of digital encryption keys, assuming that 
the behaviour of the devices employed for the key exchange can be reliably modelled and predicted. Remarkably, no assumptions 
have to be made on the capabilities of an eavesdropper other than that she is bounded by the laws of Nature, thus making the 
security of QKD “unconditional”. However, unconditional security is hard to achieve in practice. For example, any experimental 
realisation can only collect finite data samples, leading to vulnerabilities against coherent attacks, the most general class of 
attacks, and for some protocols the theoretical proof of robustness against these attacks is still missing. For these reasons, in the 
past many QKD experiments have fallen short of implementing an unconditionally secure protocol and have instead considered 
limited attacking capabilities by the eavesdropper. Here, we explore the security of QKD against coherent attacks in the most 
challenging environment: the long-distance transmission of keys. We demonstrate that the BB84 protocol can provide positive 
key rates for distances up to 240 km without multiplexing of conventional signals, and up to 200 km with multiplexing. Useful key 
rates can be achieved even for the longest distances, using practical thermo-electrically cooled single-photon detectors. 
 
Introduction - Translating the exceptional properties of QKD-enabled 
unconditionally secure key exchange [1-3] into practice requires a 
rigorous approach to all aspects of the involved protocol and hardware 
[4-7]. Several hacking attacks on QKD systems [8-18] have shown in 
the past that many underlying assumptions on protocols and 
hardware can open the door to unwanted intrusion. However, in the 
presence of ideal equipment, an eavesdropper (Eve) is powerless as 
long as the laws of Nature are not violated. In this ideal scenario, QKD 
can guarantee secure communication irrespective of Eve’s 
computational capabilities, which has been termed unconditional 
security. 
Even so, it is sometimes convenient and insightful to study the 
security of a QKD protocol in presence of a limited eavesdropper. 
Traditionally there have been three main classes used to constrain 
Eve’s attack: individual, collective and coherent (or general) attacks 
[19-24]. Only the latter does not limit the capabilities of the 
eavesdropper beyond what is physically possible. Any QKD system 
aiming to implement an unconditionally secure protocol therefore has 
to be proven secure against coherent attacks. Another aspect which 
cannot be neglected is security in a finite size scenario [25-29]. No key 
transmission session can be endless and the resulting statistical 
fluctuations have to be taken into account. For example, collective and 
coherent attacks against the BB84 protocol [2] are known to coincide 
in the asymptotic limit, whereas they can provide different secure key 
transmission rates in the finite-size case [30]. 
In the past, most QKD experiments have fallen short of the target to 
demonstrate security against coherent attacks in the finite size regime 
[31-37]. This is as much due to limitations of the employed hardware, 
as due to a lack of practical security proofs. For instance, only recently 
has the efficient BB84 protocol [38] implemented with decoy-states 
been proven secure against coherent attacks [39-40]. Other common 
protocols, such as the coherent-one-way (COW) protocol [41], are still 
lacking a rigorous security proof, while the differential-phase-shift 
(DPS) protocol has been implemented only under the assumption of 
individual attacks [42]. In these cases the gap between coherent and 
non-coherent attacks appears to be greater than in other protocols, 
and the maximum achievable transmission distance and key rate can 
be severely reduced when general attacks are considered [43, 44]. 
More demanding protocols based on entanglement distribution [45] or 
the recently developed measurement-device independent QKD [46, 
47] are secure against coherent attacks, but often provide impractically 
low secure key rates or require a significantly more complex 
experimental apparatus. 
In addition to security, multiplexing with conventional data 
communications is fundamental for the integration of QKD into 
existing optical networks. In the past, deployment of QKD technology 
has been hampered by the frequent need for dedicated “dark” fibres to 
segregate the very weak quantum signals from conventional traffic. 
The biggest limitation is the resulting broad band Raman scattering 
which swamps quantum signals rendering QKD inoperable. 
Nevertheless we have already demonstrated co-existence of QKD in 
short-reach environments such as quantum access networks [48] as 
well as high speed (> 100G) classical data traffic over distances of  100 
km for metropolitan networks [49]. Here we address long haul 
distances and demonstrate QKD’s coexistence with multiplexed 
classical signals over distances ≳ 200 km. 
In this article we implement two different variants of the efficient 
decoy-state BB84 protocol providing security against coherent attacks 
[39, 50] in a state-of-the-art QKD system and explore the limitations to 
the secure transmission distance both in dark fibre and in coexistence 
with conventional data transmission. We demonstrate secure key 
transmission over 240 km and 200 km, respectively, using highly 
practical thermo-electrically cooled single-photon detectors.  
Figure 1 summarises results of recent long-distance QKD 
experiments, highlighting the significance of our result both in terms of 
practicality and security. Electrically cooled detectors previously have 
been able to support only a maximum fibre attenuation of 34 dB [33]. 
We extend this limit to close to 45 dB and, at the same time, 
demonstrate security against coherent attacks in the finite size 
scenario. Security against general attacks has been implemented 
 rigorously for the efficient BB84 protocol only in one recent field trial 
[51] and in a proof-of-principle experiment using a plug-and-play QKD 
system [52], however, without a detailed analysis of the robustness 
and limitations in the long-distance regime. In Figure 1, the only QKD 
experiments performed on a distance longer than in this work are 
based either on the DPS protocol secure against individual attacks [34] 
or on the COW protocol secure against collective attacks [37]. 
However, the only rigorous security bounds against coherent attacks 
available for these protocols predict for them an attenuation range 
smaller than 25 dB [44]. Therefore, our results represent the longest 
distance currently achieved by a QKD secure against coherent attacks. 
It is noticeable that this is achieved in the finite-size scenario using a 
real QKD setup and electrically cooled detectors.     
 
Fig. 1. Selection of recent long-distance QKD experiments. The graph plots the 
temperature of the single-photon detectors used in the experiments over the 
maximum attenuation that could be tolerated. Following [53], we only select 
demonstrations which fulfil the practical bit rate limit of > 1 bit per second (bps). 
Two detector types are considered, avalanche photodiodes (APDs), which can be 
cooled electrically, and superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors 
(SNSPDs), which have to be cooled cryogenically. Reference [37] uses APDs 
which are cooled with a cryocooler. The data points are shape coded to highlight 
their security level: squares – security against individual attacks; circles – 
collective attacks; triangles – coherent attacks. Open symbols refer to experiment 
considering only the asymptotic limit, whereas filled symbols take finite size 
effects into account.  
Coherent security - The protocol for our experiment is the efficient 
version of BB84 [38] with decoy states [54-57], featuring high key 
rates and unconditional security in the finite-size regime. We focus on 
the security proofs described in [39] and [50], which build on the min-
entropy estimation from the uncertainty principle presented in [58]. 
Such proofs pose no assumption on the eavesdropper and assume an 
ideal behaviour of the equipment owned by the users. For short, we 
call the above two variants of the BB84 protocol “BB84
	
” and 
“BB84

	
”, respectively, and we briefly summarise their features in 
the next paragraph. Also, to show the difference in the BB84 protocol’s 
key rate when Eve performs collective or coherent attacks, we 
consider the BB84 protocol  described in [35], called here “BB84”, 
which is secure up to the class of collective attacks. As it will become 
clear later, the gap between collective and coherent attacks is small for 
the BB84 protocol, whereas it is expected to be considerably larger for 
protocols like DPS and COW [44]. 
Both the protocols BB84
	
 and BB84

	
 use three intensity settings, 
 (“signal”),  (“decoy”) and  (“vacuum”), and two complementary 
bases,  (data basis) and  (test basis) to run the decoy-state BB84 
protocol. However, the two protocols present small differences that are 
worth mentioning as they lead to different optimisation parameters 
and key rates. The BB84
	
 protocol distils the key bits in the  basis 
from all the three intensity settings. The decoy-state estimation is 
performed using the analytical equations presented in [39] and the 
protocol provides the following amount of secure key bits per key 
session: 
 
	    1     !"  #	. 1		
In Eq. (1),  () is the lower bound to the zero-photon (single-
photon) events detected in the  basis, whereas  is the upper 
bound to the phase error rate of the single-photon events. The quantity 
 !"  is the information revealed on the public channel to correct the bit 
strings of the users and is directly measurable in the protocol. Finally, 
#  6 log
21/,-.	  log
2/,/	 is a quantity related to the 
security and correctness of the protocol, quantified by the two 
parameters ,-. and	,/, respectively. For all the details about this 
protocol, we point the reader to Ref. [39].  
The BB84

	
 protocol is similar to the previous protocol, but only 
distils the key bits from the signal intensity setting,	, in the basis . It 
adopts the linear program described in [50], numerically solved, to 
perform the decoy-state parameter estimation and delivers the 
following amount of key bits:  
 

	      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In Eq. (2), the quantities have analogous meaning as in Eq. (1). 
However, the symbol  represents an upper bound to the single-
photon events, as opposed to the lower bound appearing in Eq. (1). 
This is due to a stricter interpretation of the proof method presented in 
[50] and would intuitively suggest a lower key rate for BB84

	
 
than	BB84
	
. However, this is not always the case because of the 
different parameter estimation routines featured by the two protocols. 
The quantity  !"  is the same as in Eq. (1), whereas Δ′ amounts 
to	6	log
46/,-.	  log
2/,/	. In both protocols we set ,-. ≲
104 and	,/ ≲ 1045.  
Experimental realization - We explore the limits to secure key 
transmission for both variations of the efficient BB84 protocol secure 
against coherent attacks with a state-of-the-art QKD system, which is 
based on phase-encoding and decoy states [35, 59] (see details in [69]). 
We use Corning Ultra fibre with a loss coefficient of 0.18 dB/km to 
connect Alice (transmitter) and Bob (receiver) with a fibre distance of 
up to 240 km. The attenuation at this longest distance is 44.4 dB, which 
is higher than the expected loss of 43.2 dB due to fibre connections 
between several spools.  
The receiver is based on thermo-electrically cooled avalanche 
photodiode (APD) single-photon detectors [60-62]. Electrically cooled 
APDs are the most practical solution to single-photon counting and 
they will be of particular importance for commercial applications of 
QKD. Other cooling methods such as Sterling refrigerators permit 
achieving cryogenic temperatures and therefore lower dark count 
rates [37], but they have a number of disadvantages. Their specified 
lifetime is typically no more than 5 years, they are large in size and 
heavy, and they are significantly more expensive [63], which makes 
them unlikely to be considered for telecommunication applications. At 
a temperature of –60°C we achieve a dark count rate of 10 counts per 
second (cps) at a detection efficiency of 10% with our electrically 
cooled APDs (Figure 2(a) and [69]). To our knowledge, this is the best 
noise performance of an electrically cooled single-photon detector 
implemented in a QKD system, and it compares well with what has 
been achieved with Sterling coolers [64]. 
  
Fig. 2. Detector performance and secure bit rate without multiplexing of 
conventional signals. (a) Dark count rate as a function of APD temperature for 
three different devices. The dark count rate decreases by about a factor of 2 per 
10°C. Error bars correspond to 1 standard deviation from 15 consecutive 
measurements and are in most cases smaller than the reported data points. The 
data points follow a colour code that suggests red (blue) shades for higher 
(lower) temperatures and is consistent with the colour code in Figure 3. Please 
see [69] for more details on single-photon detectors. (b) Secure bit rate as a 
function of distance for three different variants of the BB84 protocol. Black circles 
correspond to BB84 [35], which is secure up to collective attacks in the finite-
size scenario. The key rates for BB84
	
 [39] (downward blue triangles) and 
BB84

	
  [50] (upward red triangles) are calculated from Eqn. (1) and (2), 
respectively. The dashed line extrapolates the reduction of the secure key rate 
purely from attenuation in the fibre and provides an indication of the regime 
where the dark count rate plays a dominant role. 
We perform a first experiment where we send only the quantum signal 
over the fibre channel. Figure 2(b) compares the measured secure bits 

	
 and 

	
 (Eq. (1) and (2), respectively) per second as a function of 
fibre transmission distance. For each distance the detector 
temperature and biasing conditions are adapted to achieve best 
performance. The decoy state intensities are set to   0.5 
photons/pulse,   0.11 photons/pulse and   0.0007 
photons/pulse, and the probabilities with which they are selected 
are	8  0.5, 8  0.25 and	8  0.25, respectively. These 
parameters are not optimal for all the presented protocols, but 
represent a compromise which permits calculating secure key rates for 
all protocols from exactly the same dataset. Slightly higher key rates 
can be achieved in some situations when optimising the parameters. 
Also plotted, as grey filled squares, is the secure key rate for BB84 
to highlight the penalty imposed by the higher security level. For the 
shortest distance the difference is marginal, about 10%, and it 
increases to more than a factor of 2 at 240 km, where we measure 23.5 
bit per second (bps) and 8.4 bps, respectively. Both rates are above 1 
bps, which is regarded as a practical limit for telecommunication 
applications [53].  
The necessity to use dedicated, dark fibres to perform quantum 
communication would be a severe hindrance to its applicability. 
Coexistence of strong conventional data signals and quantum signals in 
the same fibre medium therefore has attracted a lot of attention in 
recent years [49, 65-68]. Operating QKD links over lit fibre is 
substantially more difficult due to excess noise generated by Raman 
scattering. The longest transmission distance achieved so far is 100 km 
[49]. Here, we explore the limits to multiplexed QKD employing a low-
noise amplifier at the receiver end and narrow fibre Bragg grating 
based 25 GHz dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) filters.  
Figure 3(a) shows a schematic of the filter arrangement at the 
sender and receiver end (see [69] for details). We combine the 
quantum channel with two conventional channels with an 8-channel 
DWDM multiplexing module at the sender side. At the receiver, a drop 
filter separates the conventional signals from the quantum channel, 
before they are amplified with a low noise amplifier with a noise figure 
of < 3.3 dB. This is followed by a de-multiplexing 8-channel DWDM 
module separating the conventional channels. The quantum signal 
itself is filtered a second time using an off-the-shelf 25 GHz DWDM 
filter to suppress Raman noise. The additional filter increases the 
attenuation in Bob by approximately 3 dB. No actual data is 
transmitted in the experiment. One conventional channel is used to 
synchronise the sender and receiver with a 15.625 MHz clock signal, 
the other channel simulates further conventional channels with a CW 
laser, we refer to this channel as the simulated data channel. An 
increase of the launch power of the data channel can be interpreted in 
two ways: simulation of transmission of a higher power data channel, 
or transmission of an increased number of data channels [61]. An 
increase of 3 dB thereby corresponds to a doubling of the number of 
transmitted channels. 
 
Fig. 3. Secure bit rate with multiplexing of conventional signals. (a) Schematic of 
the multiplexing setup to transmit conventional signals together with the 
quantum channel on the same fibre. At the transmitter side an 8-channel dense 
wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) module combines the quantum 
signal with an optical clock and a CW laser to simulate a data channel. After 
transmission over the long-distance fibre, a drop filter separates the quantum 
signal from the conventional signals. The conventional signals are amplified 
before separating them with a DWDM de-multiplexer. The quantum channel is 
filtered with a 25 GHz DWDM filter to suppress Raman noise. Also shown are: 
secure bit rate (b) and quantum bit error rate (c) as a function of receive power 
of the simulated data channel in front of the low-noise amplifier for 100 km, 150 
km, and 200 km of low-loss fibre transmission. The solid lines are the result of a 
simulation model (see [69]). The colour code is the same as in Figure 2, with red 
(blue) shades suggesting higher (lower) temperatures set in the detectors. 
In Figure 3(b) and 3(c), we plot the secure key rate and quantum bit 
error rate (QBER), respectively, measured with the multiplexing setup 
as a function of receive power of the data channel in front of the 
amplifier. The receive power at the receiver side is an important figure 
of merit, as it determines if the transmitted signals can be received 
error-free or not. QBER and secure key rate are plotted for 100 km, 
150 km, and 200 km of fibre. We plot only 

	
 for clarity, to avoid 
overlaps with	
	
, which is always very close to	

	
. The key rate 
secure against coherent attacks stays positive for receive powers 
greater than -23 dBm for a link length of 100 km. This value reduces to 
-35 dBm for a link length of 150 km. In a previous experiment [49] we 
have shown error-free operation of a 100G link together with a 
quantum signal for a receive power down to -35 dBm. Our results 
show therefore that QKD can coexist with one 100G data channel up to 
a distance of 150 km. However, the amplifier implemented in the setup 
has a specified minimum input power of -45 dBm, and it is expected 
that up to ten 100G channels can be multiplexed with QKD over 150 
km if the receive power per channel is -45 dBm. At 200 km no 
additional data signal can be launched in the same fibre together with 
the quantum signal and the clock, even with the launch power of the 
clock channel set close to the minimal value for stable locking, -8.7 
dBm, corresponding to a receiving power before the amplifier of -46.6 
 dBm. However, the transmission of the clock signal on the same fibre 
as the quantum signal is already an important advantage, as it 
improves the stability of the link. 
Conclusion - We have demonstrated that practical QKD systems 
based on thermo-electrically cooled detectors can reach transmission 
distances beyond 200 km, while maintaining security against the most 
general class of attacks allowed by quantum mechanics. This sets the 
current longest distance achieved by a QKD secure against coherent 
attacks in the finite-size scenario. Additionally, we have shown that 
multiplexing high-speed data signals (100G) with the quantum 
channel is feasible up to 150 km, while multiplexing the 
synchronisation signal only is feasible up to 200 km. The measured key 
rates compare well or exceed what has been achieved in previous 
demonstrations despite the higher security level. Our system is 
therefore ideally suited for building back-bone QKD networks, 
providing, for example, inter-city links.  Acknowledgments - We thank 
Marcos Curty and Weilong Wang for useful discussions. 
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